Thoughts On “Vietnamese Dong Appreciation & East Asian Exchange Rates”
LINK To Original Post
Alan Awesome :) This PoM site awoke the interest for geo-economics buried deep within the average gene structure. So, to continue with the PoM analysis:
The Role of an Asian Currency Unit for Asian Monetary Integration LINK
“…Box 2: A collective currency appreciation policy
Abrupt changes in international investor tolerance (or expectations) could put significant downward pressure on the US dollar. A loss of confidence in the US economy due to the likely stagnant economic conditions and mounting public debt could trigger a portfolio shift away from US dollar assets to other currencies.
In the medium-term East Asia will probably face another surge of short-term capital inflows and the consequent upward pressure on currency values, given that East Asia is the first region to recover from the global financial and economic crisis, and will likely face rising interest rates – whether policy rates or market rates – in the coming quarters.
These capital inflows are often directed to asset markets – for investment in equities and real property – and hence, if not managed properly, can be a source of macro-economic and financial sector vulnerabilities.
Adopting a policy that would allow currency appreciation is advisable in the presence of domestic inflationary pressure and incipient asset price bubbles, but such a policy could also damage a country’s international price competitiveness vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. So these problems may be difficult for a country to resolve through individual national policies alone.
However, in this instance, a most reasonable and effective policy option would be to allow ‘collective’ currency appreciation across the region, which does not differentially affect individual countries’ relative price competitiveness.
A collective currency appreciation policy would spread the adjustment cost across East Asia, thus minimizing individual country costs.
A simple calculation would indicate that a 20% collective appreciation of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar implies only a 9% effective (or trade-weighted) appreciation against trading partners – given the intra-regional trade share of 55% – even if all other non-East Asian currencies remain stable vis-à-vis the dollar.
To the extent that other currencies also appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, the degree of effective appreciation of the East Asian currencies would be more limited.
Any agreement adopting a joint currency appreciation policy would require a convergence of exchange rate regimes in East Asia to promote intraregional exchange rate stability.
To achieve this, the existing policy dialogue processes among the region’s finance ministers and central bank governors would play a critical role.
Clearly the first step toward policy coordination would be to adopt exchange rate regimes that allow greater currency flexibility vis-à-vis the US dollar. China’s yuan revaluation in July 2005 and its shift to a managed crawling peg – followed by Malaysia’s similar shift to a managed float – potentially marked the beginning of such coordination…”
Again, we have the author Masahiro Kawai – Dean and CEO of the Asian Development Bank Institute – offering academic support to the PoM thesis.
What’s interesting from this point is not IF nor WHEN the Vietnamese Dong appreciates, but by HOW much?
It’s when we read the following:
Fostering Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia LINK
“…In addition, the region is facing the risk of financial turmoil due to the US subprime crisis, US recession, and disorderly unwinding of global payments imbalances, which could result in rapid, steep appreciation of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the dollar…”
that we start to ask questions…
Dane: Thank you Alan and JC. Slight learning curve but man this is a mountain of information to learn with. Thank you for your research and sharing. POM stands alone as the best place for building a solid foundation for this time in human history. “Fulcrum”…”Onward”….Awesome :)
Cramley: As we enter the end game there is growing concern about the credibility of central banks. Worries of negative equity.
When you’re at the central bank level there is no such thing as going broke, because..
…the same weapon central banks use to levitate bond values will at the end of this game be aimed at another asset on the balance sheet to save themselves. Darth Ben hinted at this in 2002 speech as the ultimate weapon, but it may be Zhou Ren who deploys it.
Star Wars: The Force Awakens Trailer (Official)
Alan: There is something very interesting about this next Google search query. It’s a string I’ve taken directly from the work by Masahiro Kawai presented in the above link The Role of an Asian Currency Unit for Asian Monetary Integration.
collective currency appreciation
From my end this query stretches only 3 pages deep into google search results.
Is it possible Masahiro Kawai coined this term, post 2007 financial crisis, in his presentations for coordinating financial reform and economic stability of the Japan-ASEAN region? Anyways, it’s a possible fun fact :) His work cements the analysis started here by JC Collins.
Alan: We can also take this straight to the next level for those that are keen and have a thousand hours available for research, lol East Asian – Collective – Currency Appreciation
Alan: Whose not asking this question:
CHINA: Linking Markets for Growth
Published 2007 page 58
Would a large, simultaneous collective appreciation of the Asian currencies be an unambiguous gain for the United States?
We are not sure. Immediate cessation of the foreign financing of the US savings gap would translate into an immediate zero current account balance, and this would require an immediate increase in US exports and/or an immediate decrease in US imports.
Exports would increase quickly only if there were substantial excess production capacity or if there were a substantial drop in domestic demand that freed up the domestic goods for sale abroad.
Imports would decrease quickly only if there were excess production capacity (to enable replacement of imports) or if there were a substantial drop in domestic demand that reduced the use of consumber goods and inputs.
Since there is no substantial excess production capacity in the US economy today, the immediate elimination of the current account deficit would require a huge drop in domestic demand, which would have its origin in a large negative wealth shock, possibly in the form of a stock market collapse or an inflationary spike.