PatrickJane :WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT: I just made a list of all the 'gurus' that believe we are at the end of this ride...would you believe there are just as many newshounds as intel gurus that believe we are HERE?
Normanros: well kuwait rv happen at 3pm est .so that was after their banks and business closed so anything possible
Rrrr: Nothing can stop the man with the right mental attitude from achieving his goal; nothing on earth can help the man with the wrong mental attitude…. Thomas Jefferson
Avcdc: The way I see it. The groups r the best way for the UST to get us informed dinars processed. A week to 10 days they give us 800 numbers or whatever that looks like. They shut down dealers. No double dipping and by May 1 the world knows what hit them. Maybe wishful thinking here but nothing else happening this am why not give it a shot... Lol
GatorGuy: a country is basically a like a large publicly traded corporation. Corporation put out quarterly reports , forecasts, profits& losses etc to give a value to their stock. this is public information. Iraq needs a public budget for a public rate (stock price). I feel when the budget is public..so will be their new currency (stock price)
MDJ: Iraqis await elections with a heavy heart
EXCLUSIVE 15 APRIL, by Matthew Schweitzer
On April 30, Iraqis will wake from one nightmare only for another to begin.
National elections, barely two weeks away, are likely to reinforce Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s authoritarian grip on power in Baghdad and further marginalize any opposition. Elections are not the promise of stability for which many Iraqis dream, but rather the stabilizer itself. Once over, the slow sense of entropy in Iraq may well accelerate. A Maliki victory will shatter the country’s already fractious politics, intensifying violence.
The elections had inspired a tired hope that political objectives, hitherto pursued through violence, would be achieved peacefully. But if Maliki remains prime minister, as appears probable, opposition moderates will have lost this powerful argument. Maliki, in turn, will use electoral victory as a mandate to punish his rivals. These tremors could intensify the sectarianization of Iraqi politics.
Although two weeks is a long time in Iraq, a sense of inevitability has descended across the political spectrum. Many Iraqi scholars and analysts expect Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) coalition to win between 60-100 seats in Parliament, emerging with an unrivaled majority. This outlook is shared by all parties, although exact predictions vary between factions. Although it is still too early to make trustworthy estimates, several factors suggest that Maliki’s chances of winning 100 or more seats is not far-fetched.
First amongst these reasons is the opposition’s own divisions. The political parties are overwhelmingly defined by factional alignment rather than political ideology, and to a far greater extent than in the last elections (2010). Maliki’s actions against Sunni leaders have confirmed fears in their already-wary communities of what they perceive as Baghdad’s dictatorial intentions. As a result, they have re-embraced various insurgent groups like Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Islam, and Ansar al-Sunna. Attacks by these groups have provoked outrage amongst Shia communities, and widespread calls for a harsher government crackdown on Sunnis in a vicious cycle. In Sunni areas, Maliki’s SoL is seen simply as a Shia dictatorship. There is nothing Maliki will do to change this view.
Maliki has benefitted from this circular violence merely by being the one in power to begin with. In January, when Sunni extremists seized Fallujah and Ramadi, his two main rival Shia groups — the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrist Movement — responded indecisively, wary of breaking their alignment with mainstream Sunni leaders.
Both were discredited in Shia circles, where fear of Sunni terror attacks defines popular opinion. Muqtada al-Sadr has since mysteriously dropped out of the competition, a development which only further helps build Maliki’s base of support.
Although the prime minister has until now refrained from retaking the two cities, his consistently bold claims about eliminating Sunni terrorists fuels the gravitation of Shia political activity around SoL. Outraged Shia leaders see no alternative to him. In a country of little action, the prime minister’s sectarian language is important.
Although Maliki’s own strategy rests on shaky foundations, opposition parties outside his sect are in shambles. The inevitable problems of opposition in Iraq’s political system have shattered Sunni and Kurdish constituencies. In contrast to the massive Iraqiyya bloc that dominated Sunni politics in 2010, there are today six Sunni parties.
The largest, Mutahidun, is expected to win no more than 30 seats — some Sunni parties, it is rumored, are already negotiating with Maliki to join SoL after the election. In the unhappy reality of factionalized politics, such splintering is contrary to political success. Kurdish politicians are even more divided, largely due to domestic problems of independence, oil export, and internal development in the Kurdistan Regional Government.
In such an environment, Maliki’s landslide victory seems assured. The implications of this outcome are troubling. Although he perceives himself as a nationalist leader, he continues to regard Kurdish and Sunni Arab leaders as mortal enemies. His lieutenants label any Sunni opponent as Baathist and Islamist, which they consider a single conspiracy.
Maliki has thus shown little interest in making concessions necessary to open pluralistic discussion in Baghdad, or to incorporate politicians from any party but his own. His strategy has been reinforced by the splintering of his opposition. The head of the government’s Commission on National Reconciliation, for example, has argued vehemently that ISIS is merely a facade for the Baath Party, which itself is the mask worn by the Sunni leadership. These Sunnis, his statements imply, are Iraq’s most dangerous threat. A common perspective in Maliki’s government is that all political opponents are agents of foreign governments, and by extension, traitors to Iraq. Whether Maliki or his cabinet truly believe these threats is irrelevant to the outcome they promise: a silenced opposition. This rhetoric has naturally become more pronounced in the last weeks leading to elections.
The tensions embodied in the electoral preparations are kept in check by that which is their cause: the greatest restraint to violence has been the election itself. Political figures on all sides have argued for caution before the vote, anticipating that a successful election will further their political ambitions through popular mandate. These powerful incentives to eschew violence will disappear after the results are announced.
The expected magnitude of Maliki’s victory will likely exert a disheartening effect on the opposition, who cannot find ways to oppose Baghdad other than through extreme means. A deep sense of depression hangs over Iraq’s political leaders. In January, opposition leaders expressed optimism that their parties could defeat Maliki. Vestiges of these dreams hold these blocs together, but the bonds are loose. Most have resigned themselves to defeat or sought alignment with SoL. Hope is a fleeting commodity in Iraq, especially in politics, and the elections seem poised to confirm its scarcity.
Iraq is unraveling. Until now, expectations for the upcoming election had to some extent put the brakes on complete devolution. But it seems this restraint is the product of political calculation in Baghdad and the hopes of average Iraqis that the vote will improve their situation. The elections are poised to disappoint many, and reward those who espouse violence to affect political change. Frustrated dreams combined with unrestrained aggression from Maliki’s government, could push the slow deterioration Iraq has witnessed this year into high gear.
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THE AMERICAN DREAM takes an entertaining but hard hitting look at how the problems we have today are nothing new, and why leaders throughout our history have warned us and fought against the current type of financial system we have in America today.
You will be challenged to investigate some very entrenched and powerful institutions in this nation, and hopefully encouraged to help get our nation back on track.